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12. HOW OUTPUT DIVERSIFICATION AFFECTS 
BANK EFFICIENCY AND RISK: 
AN INTRA-EU COMPARISON STUDY
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how banks have been diversifying away from traditional
financial intermediation activity into noninterest income business and how this
shift has affected their efficiency and risk-taking behaviour. To this end, we
construct a global best-practice efficiency frontier following the Stochastic
Frontier Approach and relying on the technique of Battese and Coelli (1995),
which permits the estimation of the frontier and of the coefficients of efficiency
variables in a single-stage. We opt for an application of this model to the EU-
27 countries performing an intra-Union comparison between the old and the
new EU members that provides us with substantial information concerning the
level of harmonization of the European banking systems. Results indicate that
the diversification of bank output enlarges efficiency margins in both cost and
profit terms without altering the way banks treat risk. Also, environment iden-
tically affects the performance of European banks. By and large, both old and
new EU member states follow similar behavioural patterns that are not influ-
enced by product diversification, which reveals a rather harmonized European
banking market.
12.1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past couple of decades or more, the extensive regulatory changes and
the technological advances have transformed financial systems to a great extent.
Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new operating environment by
creating new products and services and expanding the already existing ones,
which allowed them to diversify the product mix of their portfolio. The tradi-
tional business of taking deposits from households and making loans to agents
that require capital has thus declined in favour of a considerable growth in activ-
ities that generate noninterest (fee) income and are not necessarily reported on
1 The author would like to thank Angelos Antzoulatos for his support and guidance. Thanks are also due to
Charles Calomiris and other participants at the 7th Conference on Research on Economic Theory & Econo-
metrics (CRETE) for their valuable remarks as well as participants at the SUERF Conference on ‘Productivity
in the Financial Services Sector’ for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer remains.
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banks’ balance sheets2. In consequence, the sources of revenues and profits of
banking institutions have been diversified as noninterest income relative to its
interest counterpart from traditional financial activities has considerably
increased3.
In the present work we assess the effect of alterations in product mix on the
performance of European banking markets. To clarify, we examine how banks in
the EU have been diversifying away from traditional financial intermediation
activity into noninterest income business and how this shift has affected their
efficiency and risk-taking behaviour. Cost and profit efficiency frontiers are esti-
mated with and without proxies of non-traditional activities in order the impact
of diversified product offerings on banking performance to be explicitly meas-
ured. Regarding risk, it plays a central role in our analysis as non-traditional
instruments are thought of as a basic tool for financial institutions to manage risk
more efficiently. Recognizing this modern way of dealing with risk exposure and
also taking into account that efficiency is likely to be miscalculated in case risk
characteristics are not included in the cost and profit functions, we investigate the
relationship that holds between product diversification and bank risk-taking
behaviour focusing on the most important sources of bank risk.
Our data set encompasses the EU-27 countries thus allowing us to test whether
the move towards the new financial intermediation business has affected the
Union’s banking systems uniformly. In other words, we examine whether Euro-
pean banking markets have jointly improved their performance by increasing
their efficiency and lowering their risk after diversifying their portfolios. To this
aim, we proceed in making an intra-EU comparison between the 15 long-term
members and the group of the 12 states that lately ascended to the Union. Such
comparative analysis can provide us with substantial information concerning the
performance of banks within the Union, thus giving us a thorough picture of the
level of harmonization in the European banking environment as a whole.
For the intra-EU efficiency comparisons to be meaningful, it is of importance not
only to allow for variation in relative factor prices across countries, but also to
control for country- and bank-level characteristics that lead to performance het-
erogeneities across banking systems or individual banks, respectively. In fact, effi-
ciency literature has reached the agreement that operational environment is such
an important component in cross-country efficiency comparisons that, if ignored,
2 A number of studies have documented this upsurge in fee-generating activities of banks using data from
different banking industries. See e.g. Rogers (1998), Rogers and Sinkey (1999), and Stiroh (2004) for US
banking; also, Rime and Stiroh (2003) and Tortosa-Ausina (2003) for the Swiss and Spanish banking sectors,
respectively.
3 It has to be mentioned here that banks have long earned noninterest income by charging their customers’ fees
in exchange for a number of traditional services like checking and cash management, safe-keeping services (e.g.
insured deposit accounts and safety deposit boxes), investment services (e.g. trust accounts and long-run certif-
icates of deposits), and insurance services (e.g. annuity contracts). This sort of income, however, has only been
a small fraction of banks’ total income.
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results will vary a lot (see e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000); Cavallo and
Rossi (2002)). We thus employ the stochastic efficiency frontier model of Battese
and Coelli (1995), which enables efficiency comparisons as it pools the data
defining a common frontier for all the countries under scrutiny also accounting
for both environmental conditions – which are far beyond the control of bank
managers – and bank-specific factors in a single stage4.
To account for differences in the regulatory conditions among the EU banking
sectors, we exploit the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Databases of
Barth et al. (2001, 2008). Moreover, the Worldwide Governance Indicators devel-
oped by Kaufmann et al. (2002) are employed to capture the various levels of
institutional development in our sample countries. The degree of banking market
concentration that provenly affects efficiency (see e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas
(2000)) is further considered in our empirical analysis. Finally, we control for
variations in the macroeconomic environment, the level of technological
progress, and the size of banks.
Our results indicate that product diversification increases cost and profit efficien-
cies without affecting the way banks treat risk. As for the environment, it has an
identical role in the performance of European banks. On the whole, the banking
sectors of both old and new EU member states are found to follow similar behav-
ioural patterns, which are not significantly influenced by output diversification.
This finding reveals a rather harmonized European banking industry.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the effect of product diver-
sification on the performance of the EU-27 banking sectors also conducting an
intra-EU comparison analysis. Indeed, related studies focus exclusively on sepa-
rate banking industries – mainly that of US – with only exception the study of
Vennet (2002). Yet, Vennet, although using data from 17 European banking mar-
kets, does not proceed in making any cross-country efficiency comparisons5. Fur-
thermore, the current work is differentiated from previous ones in that it investi-
gates whether banks alter their risk-taking behaviour after they are entangled
with diversified activities. In fact, the impact of output diversification on risk has
been rather neglected from bank performance literature. Specifically, excepting
4 The Battese and Coelli (1995) methodology, though not so recently developed, has been very lately employed
in several bank efficiency comparison studies (Cavallo and Rossi (2002); Williams and Nguyen (2005); Fries
and Taci (2005); Kasman and Yildirim (2006); Barros et al. (2007); Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2008);
Lensink et al. (2008)). Nevertheless, with only exception the study of Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2008) that
shares some common features with the current one, none of the other studies that belong to this recent empirical
literature strand shows any interest in the impact of output diversification on bank performance thus at best
accounting for non-traditional activities only parenthetically. In fact, all the above studies are designed to
address other issues, such as the efficiency differences among European banking sectors (Cavallo and Rossi
(2002)), the effect of financial deregulation on bank performance in transition economies (Fries and Taci
(2005); Kasman and Yildirim (2006)) or in South East Asian countries (Williams and Nguyen (2005)), the main
factors that explain the probability of bank efficiency (Barros et al. (2007)), and the link between efficiency and
bank ownership (Lensink et al. (2008)).
5 For a review of the existing literature, see Section 2 of the present study.
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the studies of Rogers & Sinkey (1999) and Vennet (2002) that explicitly examine
how non-traditional activities influence the level of bank risk, most of the rele-
vant studies either simply control for risk preferences by incorporating capital
ratio or total equity in their empirical models (see e.g. Lozano-Vivas and Pasiou-
ras (2008)), or indirectly consider for risk by utilizing several risk-based measures
of non-traditional activities (see e.g. Stiroh (2000); Clark and Siems (2002)). Last
but not least, the study sketches the theoretical considerations that provide the
rationale for the turning of banks into non-traditional services. Overall, the study
offers the ground to empirically test the dilemma of focus versus diversification,
which we think that has not been addressed thoroughly in the context of financial
intermediation theory.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the role of non-
traditional activities in bank performance literature, whereas Section 3 illustrates
the theoretical underpinnings of the paper. Section 4 provides a description of the
data set and a justification of the variables used. Section 5 presents the cost and
profit efficiency models and the estimation methodology followed. Section 6 dis-
cusses the empirical findings, and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
12.2. THE ROLE OF NON-TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES IN BANK 
PERFORMANCE LITERATURE
As noted earlier, deregulation process and technological innovation have let
banks to engage with non-traditional business. Although one part of bank per-
formance literature does not consider the relevance of this sort of business at all
(see Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996); Wheelock and Wilson (1999); Maudos et al.
(2002); Lensink et al. (2008)), some other has recently turned to utilize different
proxies of non-traditional products as an additional bank output. In particular,
Altunbas et al. (2000) examine the link between efficiency and risk in the Japa-
nese commercial banking sector proxying non-traditional activities with the nom-
inal value of Off Balance Sheet (OBS henceforth) items. The same proxy is also
incorporated in the output vector of the models of Altunbas et al. (2001a, 2001b)
and Casu et al. (2004) that study the efficiency and productivity of European
banks.
To continue, Isik and Hassan (2003) evaluate the performance of Turkish banks
including the risk-adjusted value of OBS activities according to the Basel Accord
in their econometric model arguing that such an adjustment provides conformity
with other bank outputs in terms of credit risk. Alternative proxies of nontradi-
tional products are also included in the output vectors of other bank performance
studies: Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and Maudos et al. (2002) use other
earning assets, Drake and Hall (2003) utilize net fee and commission income,
suerf2009.book  Page 248  Monday, August 31, 2009  4:55 PM
HOW OUTPUT DIVERSIFICATION AFFECTS BANK EFFICIENCY AND RISK 249
l a r c i e r
while Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) employ the broader proxy of noninterest
income.
Notwithstanding the incorporation of alternative proxies of non-traditional
activities in the vector of outputs, none of the above studies estimates the clear
effect that portfolio expansion has on bank performance. This gap is bridged by
a recently developed thread of literature that compares performance measures
derived by alternative models’ specifications, that is, with and without the inclu-
sion of non-traditional items. The origins of this literature can be traced back to
1994, when DeYoung explicitly addressed the impact of noninterest and fee
income on the efficiency of US commercial banking sector. DeYoung (1994) esti-
mated a cost efficiency frontier and found that the standard formulation, which
disregards non-traditional income devalues efficiency for banks with a large share
of this type of income.
Albeit several works followed that of DeYoung (1994), research has been almost
exclusively focused on the US banking system. Indeed, Jagtiani et al. (1995) esti-
mate the importance of OBS activities captured by guarantees, foreign currency
transactions and interest rate products on the efficiency of US commercial banks,
where efficiency is measured in terms of scale economies and cost complementa-
rities6. Also using US commercial banking data, Rogers (1998) formulates cost,
revenue, and profit frontiers to estimate efficiency with and without non-tradi-
tional services, which are proxied by net noninterest income. The same proxy
measure is used by Rogers and Sinkey (1999), who empirically assess the level of
involvement of US banks in nontraditional activities, and Stiroh (2000), who
examines cost and profit efficiencies as well as productivity growth and scale
economies for US bank holding companies. The latter study also uses a Basel-
based credit equivalent measure (CEM) that converts all OBS activities to credit
risk equivalents. Net noninterest income, CEM, and AEM (an asset equivalent
measure that uses the rate of return on balance-sheet items to capitalize the non-
interest income from OBS activities) are utilized in the empirical work of Clark
and Siems (2002) that gauges the importance of nontraditional activities in the
performance of US commercial banks.
As already mentioned, there is just a handful of works that use data other from
US to estimate how nontraditional items affect bank performance. To start with,
Vennet (2002) investigates the existence of efficiency differences between special-
ized and non-specialized financial institutions in Europe; the latter form of insti-
tutions consists of universal banks and conglomerates that offer both traditional
and non-traditional services. Moreover, Rime and Stiroh (2003) measure cost and
profit efficiencies as well as economies of scale and scope of large Swiss banks.
6 Using the same proxies for OBS activities, Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) study the effect of the introduction
of risk-based capital requirements on the cost structure of large US banks.
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Output is defined in such a way as to include two proxies for nontraditional
services: the CEM of OBS derivative activities and the trading and portfolio man-
agement activities. Furthermore, Tortosa-Ausina (2003) examines the role of
noninterest income on the efficiency of Spanish commercial and savings banks,
where the recent study of Casu and Girardone (2005) tests whether the expansion
of OBS activities has an effect on the productivity of five large European banking
sectors.
Although proxies of non-traditional activities, bank performance measures and
estimation techniques vary in the studies reviewed above, the empirical findings
converge to the conclusion that ignoring nontraditional activities leads to a mis-
specification of bank output7. In particular, average performance is improved
when these types of activities are taken into account. A possible explanation for
this finding might be that whereas the resources that are used to produce non-
traditional products are included in the input vector are not considered in the
output vector. Or, according to some other explanation, banks are better produc-
ers of non-traditional rather than traditional items (Rogers (1998)). In either way,
the finding that bank performance is underestimated in case non-traditional
activities are ignored corroborates the growing importance of this kind of activi-
ties in the operation of banks.
12.3. THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION THEORY: 
THE TRANSITION FROM THE TRADITIONAL TO 
MODERN APPROACH
The traditional financial intermediation theory relies mostly upon the vitiation of
the Arrow-Debreu complete markets paradigm and of the Modigliani-Miller
famous theorem. According to the former, firms and governments are financed by
households via financial markets. As these markets are assumed to be perfect and
complete (i.e. there are no transaction costs and no credit rationing, whilst there
is a full set of contingent markets), the allocation of resources is Pareto optimal
and hence there is no role for intermediaries. The Modigliani-Miller theorem, on
the other hand, assumes that all households are involved and there is full partic-
ipation in markets. This implies that financial structure is irrelevant as house-
holds can construct portfolios offsetting actions of intermediaries and thus inter-
mediation cannot add value.
Still, in real life, imperfect information and transaction costs that exist in the
economy restrict the scope for direct financing and vitiate the Arrow-Debreu
7 Exceptions are the study of Jagtiani et al. (1995) that finds no impact of non-traditional activities on bank
performance, and that of Clark and Siems (2002), which concludes that cost efficiency estimates increase with
the inclusion of OBS items, whereas profit efficiency estimates are largely unaffected.
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model of resource allocation. Moreover, there is evidence that full participation
does not hold in practice and thus the Modigliani-Miller theorem is not valid.
Accordingly, financial institutions intervene between savers and borrowers taking
advantage of market frictions8. Financial intermediaries allow transaction costs
to be shared thus obtaining an advantage over individuals. In addition, they sig-
nal their informed status by investing their capital in assets about which they have
special knowledge. By doing so, intermediaries manage to limit the problems that
asymmetric information generates.
In recent decades, however, transaction costs have been reduced and information
asymmetries have shrunk as information has become cheaper and more easily
available due to technological advances. However, these changes have not coin-
cided with a decline in financial intermediation; on the contrary, the volume of
intermediation has been enhanced. In fact, where banks’ total assets as a percent-
age of financial intermediation assets have fallen in all developed financial sectors
and the total number of banking institutions has dropped, the intermediation role
of banks has been amplified. Apparently, the traditional financial intermediation
theory, which relies on the existence of transaction costs and asymmetric infor-
mation, cannot satisfactorily explain the observed increase in intermediation
activity.
The answer to this puzzle is provided by Allen and Santomero (1998, 2001) who
revise the traditional intermediation theory. Claiming that its focus has been too
narrow, they indicate risk management and reduction of participation costs as the
primary factors that have led to the increase of the overall volume of intermedia-
tion. More specifically, Allen and Santomero argue that financial liberalization
and technological progress have generated a large amount of novel financial
products and thus the need for new markets where all these products could be
traded in. Most individuals and firms, however, have neither the appropriate
information nor the specialized knowledge to deal with this complex maze of
modern financial tools. For them, the costs of learning how to use these tools and
then participate in the new markets on a daily basis are especially high. Financial
institutions, on the other hand, are both informed and skilled enough to intervene
in the new financial markets and trade all this volume of non-traditional instru-
ments in favour of their clients at significantly lower cost. Thereby, financial insti-
8 The two major aspects of financial intermediary activity are brokerage and qualitative asset transformation.
Brokerage is usually referred to as ‘soft’ intermediation, while asset transformation as ‘hard’ intermediation
activity. By brokerage, banks match transactors with complementary needs asking for a fee-based compensa-
tion. Banks take no particular position, although reputation risk is inherent in brokerage activity. Moreover,
they have a basis of cost of gathering information; yet, information can be reused – either cross-sectionally or
through time – at zero cost. Examples of banks’ brokerage activity are transaction services, financial advice,
screening, origination, issuance, and funding. As regards qualitative asset transformation, it refers to the trans-
formation of the attributes of an asset (e.g. monitoring, management expertise, guaranteeing, liquidity creation
etc.).
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tutions facilitate participation, whereas at the same time can manage risk more
effectively.
In the EU, which is the focus of the current study, limits on banking activities were
substantially removed with the implementation of the Second Banking Directive
in 1989 and the Directive on Investment Services in 1996. These two enactments
allowed all banks to operate outside their home country and engage in all sorts
of financial services. As a result, a number of bank consolidations within and
across EU member states have taken place over the past years that led to the
emergence of universal financial institutions, which provide a broad range of
diversified activities that generate substantial amounts of noninterest income.
12.4. DATA AND VARIABLES
12.4.1. Data Description
All the bank-level data used in the study are obtained from the BankScope data-
base produced by the Bureau van Dijk and Fitch-IBCA. In particular, our dataset
is composed of commercial banks from the 27 EU member states and covers the
period 2000-2007. We incorporate all those banks for which at least four years
of data are available. This refinement allows us to reliably distinguish between
the random and the inefficiency component in the Battese and Coelli composite
error model that we use (see Fries and Taci (2005)). After checking the data for
reporting errors and other inconsistencies (missing, negative or zero values), we
obtain an unbalanced panel of 5928 observations corresponding to 741 banks9.
The choice of using an unbalanced panel is mainly justified by the fact that we
would like to account for mergers and acquisitions as well as for any bank failures
and new entries that took place during the sample period in order to avoid selec-
tivity bias. All data are reported in euros as the reference currency and are
expressed in real 2000 prices.
The data for market concentration as well as those used in the construction of the
regulatory variables were gathered from Versions II and III of the Bank Regula-
tion and Supervision databases of Barth et al. (2001, 2008)10. Since regulatory
policies do not vary a lot from year to year (see Barth et al. (2008)), we use the
information contained in Version II and collected from 2000 to 2002 for the first
four years of our data set (i.e. 2000-2003), and the Version III information that
describes the situation in the 2005-2006 period for the rest four years (2004-
9 The Battese and Coelli (1995) model has the advantage that can be estimated for an unbalanced panel dataset.
This augments the number of observations and thus the accuracy of the results.
10 An important point that has to be made here is that the Barth et al. databases refer only to commercial banks,
which is the focus of our study.
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2007) of our sample. Moreover, the degree of institutional development and the
quality of governance are captured by an overall index based on the Worldwide
Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2002). Lastly, real GDP
growth rate and interbank rates are extracted from Eurostat.
12.4.2. Variables Definition
We now move to describe the variables employed in our empirical analysis. We
justify why we decide to use these specific variables and how each is calculated.
An analysis of summary statistics is offered in Table 1.
12.4.3. Output Quantities and Input Prices
An important concern in the empirical estimation of efficiency is the definition of
bank inputs and outputs, which is strongly related to the specific role that depos-
its play in the operation of financial institutions. The banking literature addresses
this issue by largely using two approaches: the intermediation or asset approach
and the production or value-added approach11. Under the former one, financial
firms are thought of as intermediaries that transform deposits and purchased
funds into loans and other earning assets. This is to say, liabilities and physical
factors are viewed as inputs, whereas assets are treated as outputs. The produc-
tion approach, on the other hand, views financial institutions as producers of
services for account holders measuring output with the number of transactions or
documents processed over a given time period. Therefore, deposits are encom-
passed in the output and not in the input vector, which exclusively includes phys-
ical entities.
Berger and Humphrey (1991), however, propose a third approach that, contrary
to the above two approaches, captures the dual role of banking operations. In
fact, the so-called modified production approach can be viewed as a combination
of intermediation and production approaches as it enables the consideration of
both the input and output characteristics of deposits in the cost/profit functions.
More specifically, the price of deposits is considered to be an input, whilst the
volume of deposits is accounted as an output. In this specification, banks are
assumed to provide intermediation and loan services as well as payment, liquidity,
and safekeeping services at the same time.
In the current paper we adopt the modified production approach to define the
inputs and outputs since it seems to go one step further describing the activities
of banks in a more complete setting providing therefore a closer representation of
11 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the two
approaches.
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reality. Five variable outputs are specified in total: traditional banking activities
are captured by three outputs, namely total loans (y1), total other earning assets
(y2), and total deposits (y3), whereas non-traditional activities are proxied by
non-interest income (y4) – calculated as the sum of commission, fee, trading and
other operating income – and the value of OBS items (y5). As regards inputs, we
consider three of them in our analysis, i.e. deposits, labour, and physical capital.
The price of deposits (w1) is defined as the ratio of interest expense scaled by total
deposits, the price of labour is calculated by dividing personnel expense to total
assets (w2)
12, and the price of physical capital (w3) is proxied by the ratio of
noninterest expense other than personnel expense to fixed assets.
12.4.4. Risk Variables
We utilize four different metrics to capture the variation in the risk-taking strate-
gies of banks. The first two concern individual bank risk-taking, whereas the
other two measure risk at a country level. In particular, the ratio of loan loss
provisions to total loans is used to proxy credit risk (crdrisk); the ratio of liquid
to total assets measures liquidity risk (lqdrisk); the one-year standard deviation
of the day-to-day interbank rate captures interest rate risk (intrisk); and, lastly,
insolvency risk (inslrisk) is measured with the Z-score computed as follows:
where  stands for the average Return On Assets calculated by the mean ratio
of variable profits (Prijt) to total assets (TAijt), and ) is the mean ratio
of equity to total assets13. Z-score combines three elements of bank risk and is
inversely related to the probability of failure. By taking average values, we meas-
ure the z-score of the typical bank in each country at every sample year.
12.4.5. Environmental and Control Variables
With the purpose of enhancing the comparability of bank performance across the
groups of old and new EU member states, we select a set of variables that capture
a number of bank- and country-level differences. In specific, these variables
account for the level of bank regulation and supervision, the quality of govern-
12 We recognize that dividing personnel expense by the total number of employees instead of total assets would
produce a rather more accurate measure of the unit price of labour. Nevertheless, due to a paucity of data on
the number of employees in the Bankscope database, such an approach would result in the loss of a large
number of observations.
13 The definition of profits (Prijt) differs between the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications (see
Section 5.3 below). This produces two different Z-scores, one for each specification.
Zjt
ROAijt TEijt TAijt⁄+( )
σ ROAijt( )
------------------------------------------------------=
ROA
TEijt TAijt⁄
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ance and the degree of institutional development, market structure, macroeco-
nomic conditions, technological advances and bank size.
To start with, we construct five indices that describe the regulatory and supervi-
sory environment of the banking sectors under examination14. The first is the
activity restrictions index (restr) that measures the degree to which banks are free
to engage in securities, insurance and real estate activities as well as the extent to
which banks may own and control nonfinancial firms. This index takes values
between 4 and 16, with higher scores indicating a less liberalized banking envi-
ronment, where banks are prevented from diversifying their product offerings.
Moreover, we construct the capital regulatory index (capreg) that considers: a)
the stringency of regulatory requirements concerning the amount of capital that
banks must hold, b) the extent to which banks are allowed to include assets other
than cash, government securities, or borrowed funds in their initial regulatory
capital, and c) whether authorities confirm the sources of capital. This index
ranges from 0 to 8, with larger values signifying greater capital stringency. Yet,
the relationship that holds between capital and risk is rather vague. On the one
hand, capital serves as a safety net for banks especially in periods of increased
uncertainty. Under this scenario, better capitalized banks are expected to be less
fragile. On the other hand, more stringent capital regulations are associated with
reduced banks’ rents, since banks are forced to supply fewer loans. To hedge
losses, banks may engage in risky activities.
The third index is the private monitoring index (prvmon) that measures the
degree to which supervisory authorities encourage private-sector oversight of
banks and is calculated according to the following qualitative criteria: a) whether
banks are required to obtain outside licensed audits and/or ratings by internation-
ally credit-ratings agencies, b) whether an explicit deposit insurance scheme is
imposed, c) whether banks are required to disclose accurate information to the
public by producing consolidated accounts that cover the whole range of their
activities and risk-management procedures, and, finally, d) whether bank direc-
tors are legally liable for erroneous/misleading information. This index varies
from 0 to 9, where higher values implying more private monitoring. Again, there
exist contradictory views in the literature regarding the role of private sector in
bank monitoring. Some assert that private monitoring agencies operate more reli-
ably and efficiently than official supervisory authorities mainly because they are
not influenced by political or similar pressures, whereas others argue in support
of the supervisory role of public authorities.
Finally, the quality characteristics of bank supervision are proxied by two differ-
ent indices: the first is the official supervisory power index (suprvpower), which
14 The exact survey questions used for the construction of each index as well as the scoring system followed are
that of Barth et al. (2004).
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measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have the power to intervene
in the banking system. This index has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum
value of 14, with 14 being the highest level of supervisory power. The second is
the supervisory forbearance discretion index (forbdiscr) that shows the degree to
which authorities is likely to engage in forbearance in cases banks behave impru-
dently. It takes values from 0 to 4, with higher values indicating greater discre-
tion. Whereas strong supervisors can undertake specific actions against the vul-
nerabilities of the system (market failures, asymmetric information, excessive
risk-taking) that will potentially improve bank performance, at the same time, it
is easier for a powerful authority to benefit favoured constituents thus undermin-
ing competition and interrupting the development of the banking sector. Accord-
ingly, the influence of supervisory power on the operation of banking system is
rather contradictory.
To proxy the overall level of institutional development and the quality of govern-
ance we construct the KKZ index, which is the simple average of the following
six indicators: voice-accountability, political stability, governance effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Higher values of the
KKZ index indicate a more developed institutional framework15.
An important determinant of bank performance is market structure, which is
strongly related to the degree of competition. We measure the degree of market
concentration with the 5-bank concentration ratio (c5), i.e., the sum of assets of
the five largest banks divided by the value of total banking system assets16.
It is widely accepted that the demand and supply of banking services are seriously
affected by economic performance. More precisely, high levels of banking activity
are generally related to favourable economic conditions. We thus include real
GDP growth rate (GDPgr) to control for differences in the level of economic
development and also proxy the degree of bank activity.
According to the conventional wisdom big banks are heavily involved in non-
traditional activities. We thus employ the log of TA in the model to capture the
non-linear effect of bank size on performance. The inclusion of a size variable
(size) is also essential since a strong scale bias might be produced making large
banks more efficient than small banks, if otherwise.
Finally, technological changes over time are captured by a linear time trend (t) as
well as its squared root (t2) since the model used follows a second order approx-
imation (see Lensink et al. (2008)).
15 Since no values are reported for 2001 for any of these six indicators, we use the mean average of 2000 and 2002
to proxy KKZ for this particular year.
16 Concentration ratios for Austria and Ireland are not available in the Barth et al (2001, 2008) databases and are
therefore computed using data from Bankscope.
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12.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
12.5.1. Cost and Profit Efficiency Frontiers
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model that we use to estimate bank efficiency relies
on the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) of Aigner et al. (1977). SFA is com-
monly represented by two-stage parametric models: in the first stage the stochas-
tic frontier production function is specified and estimated together with technical
efficiency; in the second stage efficiency estimates are regressed against a set of
environmental variables to test whether these variables have an effect on effi-
ciency levels. However, as Wang and Schmidt (2002) point out, parametric two-
step approaches produce biased coefficients for the reason that the assumptions
made in the first step concerning the distribution of the inefficiency term are vio-
lated in the second17. The Battese and Coelli model avoids the pitfalls present in
the standard SFA by estimating bank efficiency and its determinants in a one-step
process. To clarify, efficiency scores are drawn from an ex ante specified func-
tional form and regressed on a vector of bank- and country-specific variables in
a single step. An additional advantage of the model is that it can be estimated for
an unbalanced panel data set, which enhances the number of observations and
thus the reliability of the empirical outcome.
Both cost and profit specifications of the Battese and Coelli model are employed
in our analysis. Regarding cost efficiency, it refers to technical and allocative effi-
ciency and is defined on the basis of how close the actual cost of a sample bank
is to the cost of the best-practice bank, according to which the cost efficiency
frontier is determined. Using longitudinal data the model specifies a stochastic
global cost frontier of the following general form:
(1)
where Cijt is the observed variable cost that bank i (i = 1, 2, …, N) faces in country
j (j = 1, 2, …, K) at time t (t = 1, 2, …, T); yijt denotes the vector of output
quantities for bank i in country j at time t; wijt denotes the vector of input prices
for bank i in country j at time t; qijt is the vector of risk variables that influence
bank efficiency; β is a vector of all unknown parameters to be estimated; vijt
stands for the random error term that is assumed to be i.i.d. , and inde-
pendent of the term uijt ≥ 0 that accounts for technical and/or allocative ineffi-
ciency in production and is imposed to be non-negative (as higher level of ineffi-
ciency is associated with higher cost); moreover, uijt is independently but not iden-
tically distributed, such that it is obtained by truncation at zero of the normal
17 In the first stage typical SFA assumes that the inefficiency component of the error term has a truncated-normal
distribution. This assumption is vitiated in the second stage, where a normal distribution is assumed instead.
lnCijt C yijt wijt qijt β;, ,( ) vijt uijt+ +=
N 0 σv
2
,( )
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distribution with mean mijt equal to zijtδ, and variance , i.e. 
18.
The term zijt represents the vector of explanatory variables that affect the ineffi-
ciency of bank i of country j at t and δ is the vector of the unknown coefficients
to be estimated that also includes an intercept term19. The inefficiency term can
therefore be written as follows:
uijt = zijtδ + wijt (2)
where wijt is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean
and variance , such that the point of truncation is -zijtδ, and because uijt ≥ 0,
we obtain that wijt ≥ -zijtδ.
The stochastic cost frontier (1) and the model for the inefficiency term (2) are
simultaneously estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The likelihood
function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters, that is, 
and . The cost inefficiency score for an individual bank i in
country j at the t-th observation is obtained as Costineffijt = exp(uijt), and takes
values between unity and infinity. To stay in line with bank performance literature
that measures efficiency rather than inefficiency scores, we calculate CEFFijt =
(Costineffijt)
–1, which produces the cost efficiency score for bank I in country j at
time t. Values closer to unity correspond to higher efficiency.
While cost efficiency has been almost monopolized the interest of bank perform-
ance evaluation literature, profit efficiency might be of equal or even greater
importance if compared with its cost counterpart as it combines both the cost and
revenue sides of banking operation20. Profit efficiency measures the extent to
which the profits of a sample bank fall below the profits of the best practice bank.
Literature (e.g. Rogers (1998); Stiroh (2000); Clark and Siems (2002)) estimates
profit efficiency utilizing the so-called alternative profit function, which takes
input and output quantities as given for banks letting output prices to vary. This
non-standard approach is also preferred in the current study for a couple of rea-
sons. First, in the standard profit function output prices are exogenously given
implying that banks have no market power in the pricing of their output. How-
ever, empirical evidence shows that, notwithstanding the fact that deregulation
has increased the degree of competition in the financial sector of the economy,
banks still do not operate under perfectly competitive conditions21. This provides
support to the use of the alternative profit function that allows banks to have
18 The truncation at zero safeguards that the costs of the best-practice bank are always lower than those of the
best-practice bank.
19 As Battese and Coelli (1995) note, “not including an intercept parameter may result in the estimators of δ-
parameters associated with the z-variables being biased and the shape of the distribution of the inefficiency
effects, uijt, being unnecessarily restricted”.
20 Berger and Mester (1997) characteristically argue that “profit efficiency is superior to the cost efficiency concept
for evaluating the overall performance of the firm”.
21 See e.g. the study of Bikker and Haaf (2002) that evaluates competitive conditions and market structure in the
banking sectors of 23 industrialized countries including those of the EU-15.
σu
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control over the output prices. Second, literature reports a serious lack of output
price data, which are necessary for the standard profit function approach to be
implemented. This also holds true for the current study, since it is not possible to
calculate the prices of nontraditional output for which only income information
is available. Overall, the alternative profit specification seems to be much more
attractive.
The empirical procedure that we follow in the estimation of profit efficiency is
essentially the same with that discussed above for cost efficiency, except that we
replace variable cost (Cijt) with variable profit (Prijt) in Eq. 1 and transform the
dependent variable to , where  represents
the absolute minimum value of profit over all sample banks. This transformation
safeguards that, in case there are banks in the sample that report losses, the nat-
ural logarithm is taken of a positive value. Moreover, the sign of the inefficiency
term of the profit function now turns into negative thus obtaining the profit effi-
ciency score for an individual bank i in country j at time t as PREFFijt = exp(-uijt).
PREFFijt takes values from zero to one, with unity being the highest score
achieved by the best-practice bank.
The cost (profit) function is specified as a standard translog specification. There-
fore Eq. (1) can be written as follows22:
 =
(3)
where the inefficiency term uijt is defined by
uijt = 
(4)
22 This model refers to the restricted cost function that contains only traditional bank outputs (see Section 5.2
below). The extension to the unrestricted models is straightforward.
ln Prijt 1+[ ] min Prijt( )
ln
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------------⎝ ⎠⎛ ⎞
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3
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In Eq. (3), the restriction of symmetry of the second order parameters is imposed,
i.e. αmh = αhm and βsp = βps. Moreover, the dependent variable and all input prices
are scaled by one price (here we arbitrarily choose w2) in order to guarantee linear
homogeneity in prices. Thus, the sum of the coefficients of input prices equals to
1, i.e. . The basic model that is estimated in a single-step by using
maximum likelihood consists of Eqs. (3) and (4).
12.5.2. Restricted and Unrestricted Models
As already said, we use two different frontier specifications: one that relies on the
cost function and one that relies on the alternative profit function. Across the two
specifications, three separate models are estimated to test for the significance of
output diversification on bank performance. The first model is the restricted
model that includes only traditional banking products in its output vector. The
second, which we call unrestricted model A, also considers modern banking activ-
ities by augmenting the output vector with noninterest income. The third model,
labeled unrestricted model B, differs from A in that it proxies output diversifica-
tion not with noninterest income, but with OBS items. A comparison of the find-
ings of the three models is expected to lead to a robust view of the importance of
diversified products on bank performance and risk.
12.5.3. Cost and Profit Definitions
The definition of variable cost (Cijt) depends on the vector of inputs used that
remains unaltered across the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications.
Thus Cijt is computed by adding interest with non-interest expense. On the other
hand, the way variable profit (Prijt) is defined differs between the two model spec-
ifications depending on the income-generating activities of banks. More specifi-
cally, in the case of the restricted model where the output vector consists solely of
traditional bank products that create interest income, profit is equal to interest
income less the variable cost defined above. In contrast, in the case of the unre-
stricted models (A and B), profit is calculated as the sum of interest income with
noninterest income (which is mainly produced by nontraditional banking activi-
ties) less cost.
am
m 1=
3
∑ 1=
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12.6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
12.6.1. Efficiency Estimates
Tables 2 and 3 report the mean cost and profit efficiency scores for the traditional
EU-15 countries and for the 12 New Member States (NMS). Apparently, the
banking systems of the first group of countries operate more efficiently in both
cost and profit terms (see restricted models). This superiority is further verified
when noninterest income is included in the output vector (see unrestricted models
A). In particular, cost efficiency is augmented by approximately 10% for EU-15
and by 7% for NMS. In similar vein, profit efficiency estimates increase by 15%
in the case of EU-15 and by 13% in the case of NMS. On the contrary, almost no
change is reported in the efficiency levels when OBS items are considered instead
of noninterest income (see unrestricted models B). This might be evidence that the
nominal value of OBS activities is a rather poor proxy of diversified banking
products.
We test the statistical significance of the observed differences in efficiency scores
between the restricted and the unrestricted model A of both cost and profit func-
tions by conducting the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. It turns out
that the p-value of the Wilcoxon t-statistic is below.05 in all cases, which indi-
cates that the mean scores obtained from the restricted models are statistically
lower than the ones obtained from the unrestricted models A23.
12.6.2. Output Diversification and Risk-taking
Let us now turn to analyze the performance of risk variables. Tables 4, 5, 6, and
7 document a negative and significant relationship between cost and profit effi-
ciencies with all four measures of risk. In fact, this relationship remains
unchanged across the restricted and the unrestricted model specifications. This
finding suggests that output diversification does not affect the risk-taking behav-
iour of banks.
More analytically, the results reveal that more efficient banks perform a lower
credit risk. This implies that banks should focus more on credit risk management,
which has proved problematic in the recent past. Serious banking problems have
arisen from the failure of banks to recognize impaired assets and create reserves
for writing off these assets. A considerable help toward smoothing these anoma-
lies would be provided by improving the transparency of the financial systems,
23 Using the parametric t-statistic we reach the same conclusion.
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which in turn would assist banks to evaluate credit risk more effectively and
avoid problems associated with hazardous exposure.
Concerning liquidity risk, it has also a negative sign showing that increased
liquidity leads to higher efficiency levels. This finding is rather expected as banks
have been traditionally solving their liquidity problem by holding cash together
with a considerable amount of short-term government securities that they could
sell for cash. As regards interest rate risk and insolvency risk, they are also found
to significantly reduce cost and profit efficiencies.
All in all, the estimation results suggest that higher levels of risk aversion are
related to increased levels of efficiency. And, more importantly, this behavioral
pattern is not influenced by the inclusion of nontraditional items in the model
since the signs of all risk coefficients remain unaltered across the different model
specifications.
12.6.3. How the Environment Affects Bank Efficiency
Results (see Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7) confirm the effectiveness of regulatory policies
for increasing bank efficiency. Indeed, looser restrictions on bank activities com-
bined with more stringent capital regulations, higher degree of private monitoring
and powerful supervisory authorities boost the efficiency of the EU banking sec-
tors. Furthermore, the KKZ index has a significantly positive effect on the
dependent variable in all models showing that developed institutional environ-
ments are positively associated with cost and profit efficiencies. We interpret
these results as suggesting that bank regulations and high-quality governance are
both necessary and sufficient conditions for banking systems to operate in high
efficiency levels.
To continue, the most efficient banking sectors are those with higher market con-
centration; moreover, economic development boosts efficiency since a statistically
significant positive link between real GDP growth and efficiency is documented.
This latter finding implies that an increase in GDP leads to lower total costs and
higher profits. An explanation for this could be that the more prosperous coun-
tries become, the better access to new technologies their banks acquire and this
renders them capable of producing more output using less input. This is corrob-
orated to a great extent by the finding that technological advances (captured by t
and t2) have a positive impact on cost and profit efficiencies. Finally, we report a
positive relationship between bank size and efficiency, which shows that larger
banks -that are highly involved in nontraditional activities- operate more effi-
ciently.
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12.7. CONCLUSION
In this study we examined the effect of output diversification on the performance
of the European banking systems utilizing cost and profit efficiencies as well as
the risk-taking behaviour of banks as alternative performance measures. To assess
the degree of harmonization in the entire European banking market, we com-
pared the performance of the 15 old EU member states with that of the 12
recently acceded EU countries. To make comparisons meaningful, we relied upon
the technique of Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows the estimation of the
frontier and of the determinants of efficiency in a single-stage. A number of
sophisticated variables that account for environmental differences were also
taken into account in our econometric analysis.
A rather uniform impact of output diversification on the performance of the EU
banking sectors is documented: on average, cost and profit efficiency margins
are enlarged, while the risk-taking behaviour of European banks is not critically
altered. Concerning environment, it plays an essential role in bank efficiency:
greater openness combined with strict capital regulations and strong supervision
positively affect efficiency. Economic development and technological progress
also lead to higher efficiency levels. Most notably, the involvement of banks in
diversified product offerings has no serious impact on the aforementioned
trends.
On the whole, the banking sectors of both old and new EU member states are
found to follow very similar behavioural patterns, which are not significantly
influenced by output diversification. This finding might suggest that the banking
markets in the EU are highly harmonized, paving the way for further research.
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Table 2: Cost Efficiency Estimates
Table 3: Profit Efficiency Estimates
Table 4: Regression Results, Cost Function, EU-15
Model specification
Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
EU-15 12 NMS EU-15 12 NMS EU-15 12 NMS
Mean efficiency 
scores
0.69 0.64 0.79 0.71 0.70 0.63
Model specification
Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
EU-15 12 NMS EU-15 12 NMS EU-15 12 NMS
Mean efficiency 
scores
0.72 0.66 0.87 0.79 0.73 0.66
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
constant 1.593***
(.0059)
1.944***
(.066)
1.622***
(.064)
ln(w1/w2) .617***
(.0088)
.679***
(.0095)
.611***
(.0077)
ln(w3/w2) .345**
(.164)
.399**
(.201)
.331**
(.158)
ln(y1) .475***
(.0077)
.424***
(.0081)
.471***
(.0081)
ln(y2) .503**
(.248)
.444**
(.223)
.504**
(.251)
ln(y3) .654***
(.0087)
.728***
(.0090)
.643***
(.0064)
ln(y4) .109***
(.0096)
ln(y5) .0017
(.0051)
crdrisk -1.186***
(.0297)
-1.075***
(.0176)
-1.162**
(.574)
lqdrisk -3.696***
(.5467)
-2.774***
(.4832)
-3.189**
(1.513)
inslrisk -2.437***
(.4358)
-1.873***
(.3295)
-2.264***
(.4133)
intrisk -8.176***
(.377)
-7.700***
(.514)
-9.112*
(4.982)
restr -2.785***
(.3569)
-2.999***
(.3457)
-3.205***
(.4358)
capreg .768**
(.350)
.987**
(.460)
1.086**
(.5086)
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Table 5: Regression Results, Cost Function, 12 NMS
prvmon .335***
(.0178)
.247***
(.0112)
.294***
(.0143)
superpower 1.765**
(.824)
2.893**
(1.390)
2.341**
(1.183)
forbdiscr .435
(.3210)
.789
(.5542)
.276*
(.1409)
KKZ index .180***
(.0893)
.132***
(.0631)
.239***
(.0254)
C5 .607***
(.0488)
.523***
(.0299)
.584***
(.0377)
real GDP growth rate .896***
(.060)
.818***
(.061)
.716***
(.067)
size .189***
(.086)
.193**
(.081)
.276***
(.0943)
t .131**
(.0592)
.090**
(.0431)
.110**
(.0530)
t2 .285**
(.1427)
.201***
(.0257)
.145**
(.068)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
constant 1.789**
(.8024)
2.378***
(.0247)
2.098***
(.0186)
ln(w1/w2) .430***
(.0022)
.499***
(.0108)
.436***
(.0029)
ln(w3/w2) .286**
(.141)
.345**
(.139)
.334**
(.159)
ln(y1) .321***
(.0054)
.397***
(.0678)
.654***
(.1209)
ln(y2) 1.204**
(.568)
1.498**
(.659)
1.352**
(.661)
ln(y3) .876***
(.1986)
1.069***
(.3429)
.989***
(.2361)
ln(y4) .578***
(.201)
ln(y5) .0197
(.0138)
crdrisk -2.897**
(1.365)
-4.920***
(.9830)
-3.925**
(1.792)
lqdrisk -2.734***
(.4990)
-4.528***
(.8726)
-3.852***
(.6403)
inslrisk -3.461**
(1.563)
-6.302**
(3.038)
-5.983**
(2.409)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Table 6: Regression Results, Profit Function, EU-15
intrisk -2.960***
(.6701)
-3.946***
(.8402)
-4.720*
(2.510)
restr -3.897***
(1.432)
-4.238***
(1.910)
-3.970***
(1.678)
capreg .654**
(.3186)
.765**
(.3764)
.704**
(.3548)
prvmon .782***
(.2001)
1.099***
(.3561)
.986***
(.2409)
superpower 1.854**
(.8563)
2.630**
(1.327)
2.132**
(1.008)
forbdiscr .997
(.685)
1.004
(.7024)
1.208
(.8730)
KKZ index .199***
(.0460)
.231***
(.0504)
.268***
(.0614)
C5 .753***
(.1405)
.985***
(.2540)
.783***
(.1976)
real GDP growth rate .9520***
(.2585)
1.278***
(.4127)
1.097***
(.3018)
Size .743***
(.1979)
.859**
(.2090)
.821***
(.2034)
T .396**
(.1708)
.679**
(.3231)
.530**
(.2368)
t2 1.864**
(.898)
2.288**
(1.087)
.2063**
(.915)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
constant 1.678***
(.1260)
2.893***
(.3492)
2.320**
(1.510)
ln(w1/w2) .530***
(.0196)
.674***
(.0285)
.655***
(.0233)
ln(w3/w2) .201**
(.1003)
.297**
(.138)
.254**
(.119)
ln(y1) .329***
(.0069)
.401***
(.0097)
.348***
(.0090)
ln(y2) .870**
(.432)
.999**
(.439)
.876**
(.434)
ln(y3) .762***
(.0333)
.870***
(.0431)
.797***
(.0390)
ln(y4) .604***
(.0756)
ln(y5) .0805
(.0673)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Table 7: Regression Results, Profit Function, 12 NMS
crdrisk -1.452**
(.674)
-1.987***
(.1974)
-1.760*
(.973)
lqdrisk -3.673***
(.7602)
-3.980***
(.8310)
-3.791***
(.7999)
inslrisk -2.528**
(1.243)
-2.896**
(1.350)
-2.730**
(1.338)
intrisk -4.672***
(.2407)
-6.520***
(.3510)
-5.672***
(.2890)
restr -2.845***
(.4320)
-3.563***
(.5620)
-3.133**
(1.570)
capreg .873***
(.1208)
1.093***
(.2204)
1.001***
(.2096)
prvmon .540***
(.0139)
.762***
(.0247)
.657***
(.0207)
superpower 1.650**
(.8304)
1.906**
(.8504)
1.784**
(.7969)
forbdiscr .230*
(.1401)
.320
(.2541)
.290*
(.1598)
KKZ index .260***
(.0452)
.341***
(.0650)
.328***
(.0586)
C5 .974***
(.1208)
1.891***
(.3096)
1.673***
(.2874)
real GDP growth rate .769***
(.102)
.980***
(.276)
.853***
(.236)
Size .340***
(.0410)
.783**
(.0894)
.645***
(.0761)
T .450**
(.2243)
.873**
(.4382)
.652*
(.3631)
t2 1.320**
(.5859)
1.894**
(.8575)
1.520**
(.7109)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
constant 1.532**
(.7301)
2.730***
(.4308)
2.329**
(1.1851)
ln(w1/w2) .634***
(.0356)
.762***
(.0560)
.719***
(.0521)
ln(w3/w2) .263**
(.1291)
.355**
(.1329)
.298**
(.1384)
ln(y1) .245***
(.0054)
.640***
(.0231)
.903***
(.0563)
ln(y2) 1.250**
(.5940)
1.984**
(.8623)
1.512**
(.7480)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
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Note: The first number in each cell is the mean and the second is the standard deviation of the variable. Also:
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
ln(y3) .659***
(.0320)
.983***
(.0536)
.620***
(.0382)
ln(y4) 1.562***
(.3901)
ln(y5) 1.673
(.9932)
crdrisk -1.734**
(.8404)
-2.341***
(.1620)
-1.905**
(.9199)
lqdrisk -3.782**
(1.840)
-4.871**
(2.399)
-4.494**
(2.104)
inslrisk -2.780***
(.3401)
-3.783***
(.4567)
-2.945***
(.3767)
intrisk -4.840**
(2.356)
-9.056***
(2.316)
-6.904**
(3.473)
restr -3.103***
(.5632)
-3.999***
(.6745)
-3.867***
(.6520)
capreg 1.783**
(.8212)
1.984**
(.8309)
1.876**
(.8278)
prvmon .578***
(.0145)
.767***
(.0290)
.634***
(.0198)
superpower 1.235**
(.6095)
1.784**
(.8049)
1.520**
(.7123)
forbdiscr 1.756
(1.253)
1.983
(1.421)
2.008*
(1.867)
KKZ index .278***
(.0490)
.345***
(.0734)
.299***
(.0600)
C5 1.563***
(.2710)
2.777***
(.4045)
1.967***
(.3028)
real GDP growth rate .631***
(.0890)
1.389***
(.1113)
.956***
(.0988)
Size .389***
(.0478)
.831**
(.1002)
.774***
(.0853)
T 1.563**
(.7301)
1.890**
(.8510)
1.783**
(.8459)
t2 .903**
(.4436)
1.064**
(.4599)
1.004*
(.5849)
Model specification Restricted
Unrestricted A
(incl. noninterest income)
Unrestricted B
(incl. OBS activities)
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